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I. Introduction
The year 2008 was an active year in the export controls and sanctions field. President
Bush issued a directive on the reform of export controls, spawning regulatory proposals
and revisions. Sanctions programs were modified and, in the case of North Korea, elimi-
nated. There was an increasing trend, both in the export controls and sanctions areas,
toward restrictions targeting named individuals and entities. The government continued
to actively enforce export controls and sanctions regulations. This article summarizes the
most significant changes to dual-use export controls, arms export controls, and economic
sanctions in 2008.
II. Dual-Use Export Controls
A. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE ON DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM
On January 22, 2008, President Bush announced directives to reform dual-use export
control policies to protect U.S. national security while also facilitating U.S. economic and
technological leadership.' The directives stated that the dual-use export control system
should increasingly focus on foreign end-users of U.S. high technology products so as to
facilitate trade with trustworthy foreign customers while denying sensitive technologies to
weapons proliferators, terrorists, and others acting contrary to U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests. The directives sought to advance these policies by implementing
a Validated End User (VEU) program for reliable foreign companies and expanding the
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) Entity List.
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The directives also required a regular process for systematic review of the Commerce
Control List (CCL), reducing controls on intra-company transfers, revising controls on
encryption products, and reviewing reexport controls. The directives also require BIS to
publish advisory opinions on BIS' website as well as lists of foreign parties warranting
higher scrutiny.
Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)2, discussed below, im-
plemented many of these initiatives in 2008.
B. DEEMED EXPORT AD)VISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Deemed Export Advisory Committee Report
On December 20, 2007, a federal advisory committee, the Deemed Export Advisory
Committee (DEAC), submitted recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to mod-
ernize and reform dual-use deemed export and reexport controls, such as to make the
CCL less encompassing, streamline deemed export rules, promote awareness of deemed
export controls among academic institutions and relevant industries, and reconsider the
criteria utilized to assess threats posed by foreign nationals.3 Of significance, the DEAC
recommended that the existing rule for determining the nationality of a non-U.S. person
for "Deemed Export purposes," based on the person's most recent or current citizenship
or permanent residency should be reconsidered as "superficial."4 Instead, the DEAC
proffered a more holistic approach to the deemed export analysis, whereby an overall
assessment of the probable loyalty of a foreign individual of interest should be conducted,
including consideration of the length, character, and nature of past and present foreign
ties.5 As part of its "implementing construct," the DEAC recommended that such infor-
mation should be submitted to the U.S. Government for review and approval or disap-
proval, 6 implying that U.S. exporters should not make these "loyalty" determinations on
their own. If such a review indicates a "tie" to a sanctioned or terrorist supporting coun-
try, or if any other "significant" loyalty concerns exist, a deemed export or reexport license
application could be denied. The DEAC also recommended that this consideration
should include other factors, such as the nature of the items, software, or information
proposed for transfer.
2. Public Comments Regarding BIS' Deemed Export Policy
BIS sought public comments on two specific DEAC recommendations with respect to
BIS' deemed export licensing policy.7 First, BIS asked whether the scope of technologies
2. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2008).
3. See Dep't of Commerce, DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMM r-TEE, THE DEEMED EXPORT RULE IN
THE EPA OF GLOBALIZATION 15-19 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/
deemedexports.pdf.
4. See id. at 19.
5. Id. at 21.
6. See id. at 24-30.
7. See Request for Public Comments on Deemed Export Advisory Committee Recommendations: Nar-
rowing the Scope of Technologies on the Commerce Control List Subject to Deemed Export Licensing
Requirements and Implementing a More Comprehensive Set of Criteria for Assessing Probable Country
Affiliation for Foreign Nationals, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,795 (May 19, 2008).
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on the CCL subject to deemed export requirements should be narrowed, and if so, which
technologies should remain subject to deemed export licensing requirements. The DEAC
recommended that BIS narrow the CCL to focus on technologies having the greatest
national security implications and to eliminate those having little concern. This recom-
mendation contributed to the creation of the Emerging Technology and Research Advi-
sory Committee (ETRAC), discussed below in section I.8
Second, BIS sought comments on whether more comprehensive criteria should be used
to analyze country affiliation for foreign nationals regarding deemed exports, as proposed
by the DEAC. As of November 30, 2008, BIS has not published a preliminary or final
rule revising existing deemed export licensing policy.
C. MANDATORY USE OF ELECTRONIC FILING VIA SNAP-R
On August 21, 2008, BIS amended the EAR to require that, effective October 20, 2008,
export and reexport license applications, classification requests, encryption review re-
quests, License Exception Agricultural Commodities (AGR) notifications, and related
documents be submitted via the Simplified Network Application Process (SNAP-R) sys-
tem.9 This requirement does not apply to applications for Special Comprehensive Li-
censes, advisory opinion requests, or other situations where BIS authorizes paper
submissions.'°0
D. REVISIONS TO THE ENCRYPTION RULES
In an interim final rule published on October 3, 2008," BIS revised the encryption-
specific rules in the EAR to liberalize some of the restrictions that apply to encryption
hardware, software, and technology. The amendment removes the need to notify BIS of
hardware, software, and technology classified under Export Control Classification Num-
bers (ECCNs) 5A992, 5D992, and 5E992 before such items can be exported or reexported
using "no license required" or "NIR." The following are some of the noteworthy
changes.
1. Exclusions
BIS adopted two additional "exclusions" from the review and reporting requirements
for certain "ancillary cryptography" commodities and software and certain "personal area
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9. See Mandatory Electronic Filing of Export and Reexport License Applications, Classification Requests,
Encryption Review Requests, and License Exception AGR Notifications, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,323 (Aug. 21, 2008)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 754, 764, & 772). Previously, part 748 of the EAR
set forth procedures to submit to BIS the documents required from parties wishing to engage in certain
transactions or seeking advice on the proper classification of items subject to the EAR. Parties could submit
license applications, encryption review requests, and required notifications to BIS either via the SNAP-R
system, the Electronic License Application Information Network (ELAIN), or the paper BIS Multipurpose
Application Form BIS 748-P.
10. As implemented, the rule amended EAR parts 748.1, 748.3, 748.6, and other provisions related to the
paper forms.
11. See Encryption Simplification, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,495 (Oct. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 732,
734, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 748, 750, 762, 770, 772, & 774).
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network" items, which are defined in part 772. Additionally, license exception Encryption
Commodities and Software (ENC) now excludes wireless personal area network items
with certain specifications from the review and reporting requirement.
2. Strong Encryption Items
Section 740.17(b) of the EAR defines strong encryption items that require prior review
by BIS. The provision explains when a thirty day waiting period is required prior to
exports and reexports, adds favored countries for export purposes and retains distinctions
for non-favored countries, government end-users and non-government end-users. BIS
also has raised the threshold of items exempt from the thirty-day period to include en-
cryption items with symmetric algorithms having key lengths up to eighty bits. Finally,
the provision authorizes temporary ENC treatment for items pending mass-market
review.
3. Restrictions
The rule expands the list of ENC Restricted (government end-users in non-favored
countries) network infrastructure software and commodities to include "digital packet te-
lephony/media (voice/video/data) over internet protocol."12
4. Foreign Produced Products
BIS revised license exception ENC to clarify that foreign products developed with or
incorporating U.S.-origin encryption source code, components, or toolkits are eligible for
the review and reporting exclusion only if (1) BIS previously reviewed and authorized the
U.S.-origin encryption items they contain (2) the cryptographic functionality of those
components has not been changed.
5. Reporting
The reporting requirements for license exception ENC are now split into two sec-
tions-one dealing with the semiannual reporting requirement of exports made under
ENC and another for reporting key length increases. The rule also lays out what infor-
mation shall be included in the reports for exports to distributors, individual consumers,
and foreign manufacturers.
E. COUNTRY-RELATED ISSUES AND THE EAR
1. Preventing Diversion to Iran
On September 24, 2008, BIS issued guidance concerning actions that exporters can take
to prevent the illicit diversion of items to Iran's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile pro-
grams.t 3 The guidance is part of an effort to counter Iran's pursuit of technology that
could enable it to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver
12. Id.
13. See BUREAU OF INDUST. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GUIDANCE ON ACTIONS EXPORTERS
CAN TAKE TO PREVENT ILLICIT DIVERSION OF ITEMS TO SUPPORT IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR BAL-
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them. It followed enforcement and administrative actions already taken by BIS and other
agencies against seventy-five entities involved in a global procurement network that
sought to illegally acquire U.S.-origin dual-use and military components for the Iranian
Government. 14
2. Expansion of Authorization for Temporary Exports/Reexports to Sudan
BIS issued a final rule on February 28, 2008,15 amending the EAR to expand authoriza-
tion for temporary exports and reexports to Sudan under EAR License Exception Tempo-
rary Imports, Exports, and Reexports (TMP).16 The new regulation for TMP now
authorizes reexports. Additionally, exports and reexports of exempted items can continue
to accompany persons on travel (either hand carried or as checked baggage), or they can
be sent to Sudan by an "eligible user" via a method reasonably calculated to assure delivery
to a permissible end-user. TMP also now authorizes export or reexport of software to be
used solely for servicing or in-kind replacement of software legally exported or reex-
ported. The software must remain loaded on exempted equipment while in Sudan. The
list of items authorized for export to Sudan pursuant to TMP was expanded to include
items controlled under certain ECCNs.
The revised exception retains the restrictions previously applied to permissible end-
users; permissible end-uses; and the requirement to return the temporary items to the
United States within one year or obtain permanent re-transfer, reexport, or disposal au-
thorizations for the items in Sudan.
F. AMIVEND.ENTS TO THE DE MINMIS REGULATIONS
BIS published an interim final rule revising the EAR with regard to the de minimis rule
to foreign-produced products containing U.S.-origin software and technology.17 This
amendment reflects a significant change from the prior rules to determine when U.S.
reexport jurisdiction applies to items made abroad containing U.S.-controlled content.
Most notably, the regulation makes changes to the following areas:
1. Bundling
Section 734.4 is amended to exclude, in certain cases, foreign-made commodities "bun-
dled" with de minimis amounts of U.S.-origin software from the jurisdiction of the EAR.
U.S.-origin software will remain subject to the EAR when exported or reexported sepa-
LISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS, http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/iranguidance.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 24, 2009).
14. See BUREAU OF INDUST. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERN-
MENI PARTNERS, BREAK UP IRANIAN RING CHARGED WITH PROCURING IED COMPONENTS (Sept. 17,
2008), htrp://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/bis-pressO9l72008.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
15. See Expanded Authorization for Temporary Exports and Reexports of Tools of Trade to Sudan, 73 Fed.
Reg. 10,668-70 (Feb. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 740). Previously, TMP only allowed for the
personally accompanied temporary export (and not the reexport) of a limited scope of commodities used only
for humanitarian assistance (and not specific related support activities) in Sudan.
16. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 740.9).
17. See De Minimis U.S. Content in Foreign Made Items, 73 Fed. Reg. 56,964 (Oct. 1, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 15 C.F.R. pts. 730, 732, 734, 736, 762, & 774).
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rately from (i.e., not incorporated or bundled with) a foreign made commodity, and ex-
ports or re-exports of software for additional users and upgrades are considered separate
transactions for export control purposes. The "bundling" concept applies to "software
that is configured for a specific commodity, but is not necessarily physically integrated
into the commodity." 5 Only certain U.S.-origin software falls within the scope of bun-
dling for foreign made commodities. The rule applies exclusively to software controlled
for Anti Terrorism (AT) reasons or that is classified as "EAR99." Therefore, software that
is controlled for other reasons, such as ECCN 5D002 encryption software or software
that might be associated with specific products and controlled for reasons other than anti-
terrorism controls, will not be considered bundled with foreign-produced items and shall
remain subject to the EAR.
2. Revised De Minimis Calculations
Supplement No. 2 to part 734 of the EAR, which includes guidelines for calculating de
minimis values as defined by section 734.4, was amended in various respects. The amend-
ment clarifies the previous rule on "controlled" content, noting that U.S.-origin content
need be included in the de minimis calculation only if it is controlled for re-export to the
end destination, and stipulating that part 744 controls should not be considered in making
this assessment.19 Special rules on encryption in section 734.4(b) are retained. The gui-
dance also clarifies that costs should be determined by the local market costs in the coun-
try of export, and that cost depreciation for components is not permitted.
3. Definition of "Incorporated"
Supplement No. 2 to part 734 was amended to clarify that U.S.-origin controlled con-
tent is considered "incorporated" for de minimis purposes if the item is: (1) "essential to
the functioning of the foreign equipment"; (2) "customarily included in sales of the for-
eign equipment"; and (3) "reexported with the foreign produced item." 20 BIS has re-
moved the "rack mounted" and "cable connected" concepts previously utilized to
determine the extent to which U.S.-origin content is incorporated into foreign produced
items.
4. One Time Report
Based on prior reporting history, BIS removed the one-time reporting requirement for
foreign-made software that incorporated controlled U.S.-origin software. But BIS is
maintaining the one-time report requirement for foreign-made technology that incorpo-
rates controlled U.S.-origin technology.
G. RULE FOR AMENDMENTS TO ENTITY LIST
On August 21, 2008, BIS published a final rule amending the EAR concerning export
and reexport requirements for persons and entities designated on the Entity List (Supple-
18. Id. at 56,966.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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ment No. 4 to part 744).21 A newly established, inter-agency End-User Review Commit-
tee (Committee) will have the discretion to add, remove, or modify a party's designation
on the Entity List. An entity may be added to the Entity List where there is reasonable
cause to believe that it has been involved in, or poses a risk of being involved in, activities
against U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or is acting on behalf of such an
entity. Examples of conduct the Committee may view as grounds for designating parties
on the Entity List include: (1) "supporting persons engaged in acts of terror;" (2) enhanc-
ing the military capability of, or supporting terrorism sponsored by, foreign governments
designated by the State Department as providing support for acts of terror; (3)
"[t]ransferring, developing, servicing, repairing, or producing conventional weapons," or
enabling such action "by supplying parts, components, technology, or financing" for
weapons, contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests; (4) "preventing
[the] accomplishment of an end use check conducted by or on behalf of BIS or the Direc-
torate of Defense Trade Controls;" or (5) "engaging in conduct that poses a risk of violat-
ing the EAR when such conduct raises sufficient concern that prior review of exports or
reexports involving the party, and the possible imposition of license conditions or license
denial, enhances BIS ability to prevent violations of the EAR."22
Finally, the rule amended section 744.16 and adds new Supplement No. 5 to part 744,
allowing a party listed on the Entity List to request that its designation be removed or
modified, and providing procedures for making such requests, which will be considered by
the newly-established Committee.
BIS also amended the EAR by adding 108 additional persons to the Entity List who the
U.S. Government determined to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States. 23
H. PROPOSED RULE ON LICENSE EXCEPTION FOR INT-RA-ComPANY TRANSFERS
BIS published a proposed rule amending the EAR to add a new license exception enti-
tled Intra-Company Transfer (ICT).24 ICT would allow for license-free exports and reex-
ports to and among affiliated entities as long as certain requirements are met. The
exception would not be available automatically. Instead, a parent company must first sub-
mit an internal control plan, among other information, which BIS would review to deter-
mine whether the company merits use of the exception. Even then, ICT would be
restricted to pre-approved subsidiaries and ECCNs. There also would be reporting, au-
diting, and recordkeeping requirements for companies that make use of this license excep-
tion. Further details on the proposed rule for ICT are provided below:
21. See Authorization to.Impose License Requirements for Exports or Reexports to Entities Acting Con-
trary to the National Security or Foreign Policy Interests of the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,311 (Aug. 21,
2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 730, 744, & 756).
22. Id. at 49,311-312; 15 C.F.R. § 744.11(b) (2008).
23. See Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List and Removal of General Order from the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), 73 Fed. Reg. 54,499 (Sept. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 736
& 744).
24. See Export Administration Regulations: Establishment of License Exception Intra-Company Transfer
(ICT), 73 Fed. Reg. 57,554 (Oct. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740 & 772).
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1. Eligible Entities
Only a parent company would be authorized to apply for use of ICT, although it does
not have to be an ultimate parent company. The parent company must be incorporated in
or have its principal place of business in the United States or one of thirty-seven other
countries listed in Supplement No. 4 to part 740 of the EAR. Eligible users and recipients
under this license exception include wholly-owned or controlled in-fact-subsidiaries or
branches of the parent company.
2. Restrictions
ICT may not be used to export, reexport, or transfer items to any countries (or nation-
als thereof) in Country Group E or North Korea. Items exported, reexported, or trans-
ferred under ICT may be subsequently exported, reexported, or transferred in accordance
with the EAR but not under license exception APR (Additional Permissive Reexports).
The license exception also does not apply to items controlled for Encryption Items (El) or
Significant Items (Si) reasons, nor can it be used to transfer technology to foreign national
employees without valid work authorization or those on any U.S. Government end-user
list of concern.
3. Reporting Requirements
Approved companies must submit an annual report to BIS, including the following in-
formation: (1) data on foreign national employees that received technology or source
code under license exception ICT during that year; (2) data on foreign national employees
that terminated their employment during that year; and (3) a certification that all ap-
proved eligible users and recipients are in compliance with the applicable terms and condi-
tions, including the results of the self-evaluations. 25
4. Audits
BIS will conduct biennial audits of approved companies, eligible users, and eligible
recipients.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY & RESEARCH COMMITTEE
On May 23, 2008, BIS announced the creation of a new Emerging Technology and
Research (ETRAC) Advisory Committee and invited public and private sector experts to
apply for membership.26 The ETRAC has a mandate to identify emerging technologies
and research and development activities that may be of interest from a dual-use perspec-
tive; prioritize new and existing controls related to deemed exports to determine which are
of greatest consequence to national security; and examine how research is performed to
understand the impact that the EAR have on academia, federal laboratories, and industry.
25. Michael Gershberg & Edward Krauland, Steptoe & Johnson, International Law Advisory-BIS Pub-
lishes Proposed Rule on License Exception for Intra-Company Transfers (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.steptoe.
com/publications-5614.html.
26. See Establishment of the Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Committee, 73 Fed. Reg.
30,048 (May 23, 2008).
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J. ExPANSION OF ELIGIBLE ITEMS UNDER LICENSE EXCEPTIONS TMP AND BAG
On December 12, 2007, BIS issued a final rule 27 amending the EAR to expand and
clarify eligibility under two widely-used EAR license exceptions, TMP 28 and License Ex-
ception BAG (Baggage).2 9 The revisions allow for the export or reexport of technology
and technical information subject to the EAR by U.S. persons to U.S. persons or their
employees traveling or temporarily assigned abroad, subject to certain important limita-
tions. Previously, TMP and BAG focused only on hardware and software and did not
authorize technology exports and reexports. The eligible items now include technology,
in the form of actual shipments, transmissions, or other "releases." The other categories
of exports/reexports authorized under TMP and BAG apart from "tools of trade" con-
tinue to be limited to hardware and software. The "tools of trade" provisions in TMP and
BAG are subject to a number of limitations as described in further detail by the rule.
K. FOREIGN AvAILABILITry ASSESSMENT PROCESS
On September 2, 2008, BIS announced a ninety-day study to assess the foreign availa-
bility of uncooled thermal imaging cameras in the People's Republic of China.30 BIS
initiated the study in response to a petition filed by the Sensors and Instrumentation Tech-
nical Advisory Committee (SITAC) asserting that uncooled thermal imaging cameras are
widely available in China and render U.S. export controls ineffective in achieving their
purpose.31 If foreign availability exists, the Department may remove the license require-
ment, unless the President determines that this would be detrimental to national security.
L. BIS STUDY ON HIGH PRECISION MACHINE TOOLS
On May 19, 2008, BIS initiated a systematic study of the U.S. 5-axis simultaneous con-
trol machine industry.32 BIS intends to assess the health and competitiveness in the indus-
try and the impact of export control practices and foreign availability on the industry.
Further, BIS will examine the capability of U.S. and foreign members of this industry to
meet U.S. national security needs.
M. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS / PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS FOR 2008
In Fiscal Year 2008, BIS's Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) continued to focus on
violations relating to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery
27. See Revisions to License Exceptions TMP and BAG: Expansion of Eligible Items, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,509
(Dec. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 740 & 772). These revisions to the EAR are effective
immediately. There is no formal comment period for the regulation, but BIS has invited public comments on
a continuing basis.
28. 15 C.F.R. § 740.9 (2008).
29. 15 C.F.R. § 740.14 (2008).
30. See Foreign Availability Assessment: Uncooled Thermal Imaging Cameras Incorporating
Microbolometer Focal Plane Arrays, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,271 (Sept. 2, 2008).
31. Id.
32. See Press Release, Bureau of Indus. and Sec., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Commerce Department Under-
takes Industry Study of High Precision Machine Tools (May 19, 2008), http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/
5axis_05192008.htm.
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systems, terrorism, and diversions of dual-use goods to military end uses. In Fiscal Year
2008, BIS closed nine enforcement cases where the recently-increased maximum civil
penalty amount ($250,000) was available pursuant to enhancements under the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).33 Of those cases, two involved criminal
charges, and none of the parties voluntarily disclosed the violations. Each case resulted in
a settlement. The average penalty paid per case was $95,982 in non-criminal cases and
$266,595 in criminal cases. 34
In addition to penalizing U.S. persons and entities, BIS focused its enforcement efforts
on foreign entities. For example, on July 17, 2008, BIS sentenced a French company,
Cryostar SAS, to a criminal fine of $500,000 and two years probation for its role in a
conspiracy to sell cryogenic pumps to Iran. 35 Cryostar, together with two other French
companies, had developed a plan to conceal the sale of the pumps to an Iranian customer.
III. Arms Export Controls
A. TREATIEs WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA
The United States moved toward implementation of two defense trade cooperation
treaties signed in 2007, one with the United Kingdom and the other with Australia. If
ratified, the treaties will permit license-free exporting of certain International Traffic in
Arms Regulation (ITAR) controlled items and services in specified programs to members
of an "Approved Community" of governments and companies in each country. Transfers
outside the Approved Community would remain subject to U.S. State Department licens-
ing. Exports expected to benefit from the treaties include those supporting the "combined
military and counter-terrorism operations; joint research, development, production and
support programs" 36 and certain other projects where the end user is the government of
the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia. The Approved Community would
include companies registered with the U.S. State Department's Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC) under ITAR part 122, unless debarred. The U.K. government
will not require licenses to export these defense articles to members of the Approved
Community and may permit such exports under blanket or open authorizations. The
Australia treaty text is generally similar to the U.K. treaty.
For both treaties, specific procedures and parameters are described in bilateral imple-
menting arrangements finalized in 2008. The State Department developed draft regula-
tions for the U.K. treaty and posted these on the DDTC website for comment. In
September 2008, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stating that the
Committee continues to support the objectives of the two treaties but would not be able
33. See BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CASES CLOSED WITH $250,000
MAXIMUM PENALTY-NO CARVE-OuT EXCEPnON (FY 2008 Final Orders $250,000 Chart), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/closedcases.pdf.
34. Id.
35. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MAJOR CASES LIST (Oct. 2008), available
at http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/majorcaselist/mcl1 02008.pdf.
36. Hearing on Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of John C. Rood, Acting Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State).
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to approve the two treaties during the current Congressional session. 37 The U.K. govern-
ment has ratified the U.K. treaty. In Australia, the Parliamentary Joint Standing Commit-
tee on Treaties has made its recommendations and legislation necessary to give effect to
the treaty is expected to be submitted to the Federal Parliament in 2009 for passage.
B. U.S. MUNITONS LIST AND INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS
The ITAR was amended once in late December 2007 and eight times in 2008.
1. Dual and Third Country Nationals
On December 19, 2007, 22 C.F.R. sections 124.12 (a) (1) and 124.16 were amended38 to
allow access to defense articles and services for dual and third country nationals of certain
countries through revisions in procedures for technical assistance agreements and manu-
facturing licensing agreements. This regulatory change was intended to reduce the bur-
den on exporters of defense articles and on foreign parties to the agreements by reducing
the number of individual Non Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) that must be executed and
maintained on file.
2. Sri Lanka
On March 24, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 126 was amended 39 to make it a policy to deny
licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense
services to Sri Lanka except, on a case-by-case basis, for technical data or equipment made
available for the limited purposes of maritime and air surveillance and communications.
3. NATO Organizations
On March 26, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 123.9(e) was amended to clarify U. S. policy to
allow for reexports or retransfers of U.S.-origin components incorporated into a foreign
defense article to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its agencies, as
well as to NATO member governments. 40
37. Letter from Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, & Richard G.
Lugar, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of
State (Sept. 17, 2008).
38. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Regarding Dual and Third Country
Nationals, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,785 (Dec. 19, 2007) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 124).
39. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Sri Lanka, 73 Fed. Reg. 15,409 (Mar. 24,
2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 126).
40. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 73 Fed. Reg. 15,885 (Mar. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 123).
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4. U.S. Munitions List Correction
On May 19, 2008, 22 C.F.R. part 121.1(b) was corrected4l by adding an asterisk to
indicate that the paragraph refers to Significant Military Equipment.42
5. Registration Renewals
On July 8, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 122.3 was amended to limit the registration period
to one year and to require registrants to submit renewal packages within sixty days before
their current expiration date.43
6. U.S. Munitions List Civil Aircraft Components
On August 14, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 121.1, Category VIII (b), (h), and the Note,
were amended to clarify how the criteria of section 17(c) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 are implemented in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act. 44 This rule
reinstated the section 17 (c) reference in the ITAR to assist exporters in understanding the
scope and application of the section 17(c) criteria to parts and components for civil air-
craft. It also clarified that
any part or component that (a) is standard equipment; (b) is covered by a civil aircraft
type certificate (including amended type certificates and supplemental type certifi-
cates) issued by the Federal Aviation Administration for civil, non-military aircraft
([expressly excluding] military aircraft certified as restricted and any type certification
of Military Commercial Derivative Aircraft, defined by FAA Order 8110.101 effective
date September 7, 2007 as "civil aircraft procured or acquired by the military"); and
(c) is an integral part of such civil aircraft, is subject to the jurisdiction of the [EAR].
Where such part or component is not Significant Military Equipment ("SME"), no
Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) determination is required to determine whether the
item meets these criteria for exclusion under the United States Munitions List
(USML) unless doubt exists as to whether these criteria have been met. However,
where the part or component is SME, a CJ determination is always required, except
where a SME part or component was integral to civil aircraft prior to the effective
date of this rule.
Additionally, this proposed rule [added] language in a new Note after Category
VIII(h) to provide guidelines concerning the parts or components meeting these cri-
teria. The change to Category VllI*(b) also identifies and designates certain sensitive
military items, heretofore controlled under Category VII(h), as SME. 4s
41. Correction to the Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: The United States
Munitions List, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,863 (May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121).
42. "Significant military equipment means articles for which special export controls are warranted because
of their capacity for substantial military utility or capability." 22 C.F.R. § 120.7(a) (2008).
43. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Renewal of Registration, 73 Fed. Reg.
41,258 (July 18, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 122).
44. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: The United States Munitions List Cate-
gory VIII, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,523 (Aug. 14, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121).
45. Id.
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7. U.S. Munitions List Toxicological Agents
On September 9, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 121.1(c), was amended to add Note 5 to
Category XJV-Toxicological Agents-to clarify that certain anti-tumor drugs are not
within the definition of "chemical agents." But, the definition retained the know-how for
production of nitrogen mustards or their salts on the U.S. Munitions List.46
8. Rwanda
On September 25, 2008, 22 C.F.R. section 126.1(c) was amended to remove Rwanda
from the list of prohibited countries as a result of United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 1823, which terminated remaining arms sanctions against Rwanda. 47
9. Increased Registration Fees
On September 25, 2008, 22 C.F.R. parts 122 and 129 were amended to increase regis-
tration fees charged to persons required to register with the Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, 48 change the registration re-
newal period, and make other minor administrative changes.4 9
C. MAJOR ENFORDEMENT ACTIONS
1. Major Civil Settlements
a. Northrop Grumman
On March, 14, 2008, Northrop Grumman Corporation of Los Angeles, California,
agreed to pay civil penalties of fifteen million dollars and take additional corrective actions
to settle 110 ITAR violations that it and its predecessor in interest, Litton Industries, Inc.
(which Northrop acquired in April 2001), allegedly committed between 1994 and 2003 in
connection with unauthorized exports of modified versions of its commercial LTN-72 and
LTN-92 Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), related software source code, and related de-
fense services.5 0
b. Boeing
On June 9, 2008, the Boeing Company of Chicago, Illinois, agreed to pay civil penalties
of three million dollars and take additional corrective actions to settle forty alleged ITAR
46. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List Interpretation, 73
Fed. Reg. 54,314 (Sept. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121).
47. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Rwanda, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,441 (Sept. 25,
2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 126).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
49. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Registration Fee Change, 73 Fed. Reg.
55,439 (Sept. 25, 2008) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 122 & 129).
50. See Consent Agreement, In re Northrop Grumman Corporation (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/con-
sent-agreements/pdf/NorthropGrummanCorpConsentAgreement.pdf.
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violations in connection with the administration of Manufacturing License Agreements
(MLAs) and Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs). 51
c. Lockheed Martin
On July 24, 2008, Lockheed Martin Corporation of Arlington, Virginia, agreed to pay
civil penalties of four million dollars and take additional corrective actions to settle eight
alleged ITAR violations in connection with unauthorized export of classified and unclassi-
fied technical data to United Arab Emirates, export of classified technical data related to
Hellfire missiles to foreign persons, export of classified technical data relating to the Joint
Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile to a major non-NATO ally, failure to notify DDTC of
proposals for the sale of significant military equipment, and failure to obtain a Non-trans-
fer & Use Certificate for export of classified technical data.52
2. Major Criminal Convictions
a. Roth
On September 3, 2008, a jury in the Eastern District of Tennessee convicted former
University of Tennessee Professor J. Reece Roth of fifteen counts of violating the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) by exporting controlled technical data, and one count of
conspiring with Atmospheric Glow Technologies, Inc. (AGT) to unlawfully export con-
trolled technical data. 53 The controlled technical data in this case related to plasma actua-
tors for unmanned aerial vehicles or drones that were developed under a U.S. Air Force
research and development contract. Roth provided this technical data to Chinese and
Iranian foreign nationals who were students at the University of Tennessee. Roth also
carried documents containing controlled military data with him on a trip to China, and he
caused other controlled military data to be emailed to an individual in China. Sentencing
in this case is scheduled for January 7, 2009.54 AGT pleaded guilty on August 20, 2008, to
charges of illegally exporting U.S. military data about drones to a Chinese citizen in viola-
tion of the AECA.55
b. Meng
On June 18, 2008, a judge in the Northern District of California sentenced a Canadian
citizen, Xiaodong Sheldon Meng, to two years in prison, three years of supervised release,
51. See Consent Agreement, In re Boeing Company (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, June 9, 2008), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consentagreements/pdf/Boeing-
ConsentAgreement_08.pdf.
52. See Consent Agreement, In re Lockheed Martin Corporation (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, July 24, 2008), available at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/con-
sent-agreements/pdf/LockheedMartinCorp-ConsentAgreement_08.pdf.
53. Press Release, James R. Dedrick, U.S. Att'y, E. Dist. of Tenn., Dep't of Justice, Retired University of
Tennessee Professor Convicted of Arms Export Control Violations (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/me/pr/2008/September/Roth%2OGuilty%2OPress%20Release.htm.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Plea Agreement of Defendant Atmospheric Glow Techs., Inc. at 11 5(b)-(h), United States v. Roth,
No. 3:08-CR-69 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008).
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and a $10,000 fine.5 6 On August 1, 2007, Meng had pleaded guilty to committing eco-
nomic espionage and to violating the AECA. Meng had misappropriated a trade secret
involving night vision software for pilots "from his former employer, Quantum 3D, Inc.,
[and he had done so] with the intent to benefit" China's Navy Research Center in Beij-
ing.5 7 He had also illegally exported military source code pertaining to a program for
training military fighter pilots. This case is the first to result in a conviction for exporting
military source code under the AECA. In addition, Meng is the first defendant to be
sentenced under the Economic Espionage Act.5 8
c. Mak
On March 24, 2008, a judge in the Central District of California sentenced Chi Mak, a
U.S. citizen, to twenty-four years and five months in prison, and a $50,000 fine for con-
spiracy to obtain and send ITAR-controlled technical data relating to U.S. naval warship
technology to China. 59 Mak, who was formerly an engineer with a U.S. navy contractor,
was convicted of conspiracy to violate the AECA, attempting to violate the AECA, acting
as an unregistered agent for a foreign government, and making false statements to federal
investigators. Mak's co-conspirators in China had requested U.S. naval research on nu-
clear submarines, among other information. The four co-defendants, who included his
brother and wife, also pleaded guilty and have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment.6°
d. Euro Optics, Ltd.
On March 17, 2008, Euro Optics, Ltd. pleaded guilty "to illegally exporting advanced
combat gun sights to Sweden and Canada."6 1 "On July 24, [the judge] in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania [sentenced Euro Optics] to a $10,000 corporate fine, $800 special
assessment, and five years of corporate probation." 62
IV. Economic Sanctions
During 2008, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury (OFAC) continued its trend of recent years by emphasizing targeted programs against
specific individuals, activities and companies in lieu of adopting new, broad-based eco-
nomic sanction programs. 6
3
56. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage Gune 18, 2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/june/08-nsd-545.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
57. Id.
58. Id.; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Meng, No. 5:04-CR-20216-JF (N.D. Cal. June 24,
2008).
59. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chinese Agent Sentenced to Over 24 Years in Prison for Exporting
United States Defense Articles to China (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/
08_nsd_229.html.
60. Id.; Judgment & Probation/Commitment Order, United States v. Mak, No. 8:05-CR-00293-CJC (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 2008).
61. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Major U.S. Export Enforcement Prosecutions During the
Past Two Years (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-nsd-959.html.
62. Id.; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Euro Optics, Ltd., No. 4:07-CR-0407 (M.D. Pa.
July 31, 2008).
63. Of the first seventy-eight public releases published on the OFAC website in 2008, forty related prima-
rily to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOR-
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A. BELARUS
On September 4, 2008, OFAC issued a new general license64 that authorized transac-
tions between U.S. persons and two of the three entities that had been only recently desig-
nated under the Belarus sanctions program on May 15, 2008.65 But all property and
interests in property of these two entities, Lakokraska OAO or Polotsk Steldovolokno
OAO, that were previously blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13405 remained
blocked. "66
B. BURMA
On May 6, 2008, and May 9, 2008, OFAC issued two new general license exceptions to
the Burmese Sanctions Regulations. 67 The first of these licenses authorized the exporta-
tion and reexportation of certain financial services to Burma in support of not-for-profit
humanitarian or religious activities in Burma of U.S. or third-country non-governmental
organizations. 68 Subsequently, OFAC authorized U.S. financial institutions to process
certain transfers of funds, of any amount, for non-commercial, personal remittances "to or
from Burma or for or on behalf of an individual ordinarily resident in Burma," in excess of
the previous limit of three hundred dollars per Burmese household for any consecutive
three-month period. 69
EIGN ASSETS CONTROL, 2008 OFAC RECENT ACTIONS, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
actions/2008.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 OFAC].
64. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONT ROL, BELARUS SANCTIONS, GEN.
LICENSE No. 1 (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/belarus/
gls/belarus-gl-l.pdf.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, RECENT OFAC ACTIONS
(May 15, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20080515.shtml (last .visited Mar. 25,
2009).
66. See Exec. Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 16, 2006) (implementing new economic sanc-
dons against "certain members of the Government of Belarus and other persons [believed to have] under-
mine[d] Belarus' democratic processes or institutions," primarily during the country's March 2006 elections,
as well as to have "commit[ted] human rights abuses" and to have "engage[d] in public corruption").
67. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Authorizes Unlimited Personal Remittances to
Burma (May 12, 2008), http'J/www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp974.htn; see also Burmese Sanctions Regula-
dons, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/burma/
gls/burmas.html.
68. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, BURMESE SANCTIONS REGS.,
GEN. LICENSE No. 14 (May 6, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/pro-
grams/burna/gls/burmagll4_amend.pdf; U.S. Di.P'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CON-
TROL, BURMESE SANCIONS REGS., GEN. LICENSE No. 15 (May 9, 2008), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/officeslenforcement/ofac/programs/burma/gls/burmagll5.pdf. Also, on May 9, 2008, and
then again on July 11, 2008, OFAC issued amendments to General License No. 14 to authorize, for a period
of 120 days each, funding to any organization or individual engaged in not-for-profit humanitarian or relig-
ious activities in Burma through January 4, 2009. The previously issued General License No. 14 only author-
ized the transfer of funds in support of not-for-profit humanitarian or religious activities in Burma only if
they involved U.S. or third-country non-governmental organizations. Upon the expiration of these extension
periods, the terms of the original General License No. 14 remain in effect.
69. Id.
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C. CUBA
In 2008, OFAC updated its list of authorized providers of air, travel, and remittance
forwarding services70 and made several automation improvements to expedite the process-
ing of Cuban travel licenses and requests for the release of blocked funds.71 In addition,
on July 29, 2008, OFAC issued a notice clarifying that the transfer of a claim against the
Government of Cuba, even if certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
generally requires OFAC authorization.72
D. IRAN
Effective November 10, 2008, OFAC amended the Iranian Transactions Regulations to
revoke its previous authorization allowing U.S. depository institutions to process "U-
turn" transfers. A "U-turn" transfer is a transaction that is initiated offshore as a dollar-
denominated transaction by order of a foreign bank's customer, is then transfered from a
correspondent account for that foreign bank, is further transferred to a correspondent
account held by the same or another domestic bank for a second foreign bank, and is then
returned offshore as a transfer to a dollar-denominated account of the second foreign
bank's customer. 73 The amendment, however, did not revoke certain "U-turn" transac-
tions that are authorized by a specific or general license or are exempt or not otherwise
prohibited by the Iranian Transaction Regulations.
E. NORTH KOREA
On June 26, 2008, the President signed a proclamation 74 stating that the application of
the Trading With the Enemy Act 75 was no longer in the U.S. national interest.76 As a
result of this action, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the Transaction Control
Regulations no longer apply to North Korea. 77 But contemporaneously with the release
of the proclamation, the President also issued an executive order78 continuing certain re-
70. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, Lisr OF AUTF1ORZED PROV-
IDERS OF AIR, TRAVEL AND RIEM-I-ANCE FORWARDING SERVICES TO CUBA (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/cuba/cuba-tsp.pdf.
71. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTrROL, RECENT OFAC ACrIONs
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20080912a.htrnl.
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, NOTICE RFGARDING
THIE TRANSFER OF CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA CERTIFIED BY rHe FOREIGN CLAIMS SE-tTLEMNENr COMIS-
SION (July 29, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/cuba/fcs.pdf.
73. Iranian Transactions Regs., 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541 (Nov. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts.
560.516, 560.405 and 560.532).
74. Proclamation No. 8271, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,785 (June 26, 2008) [hereinafter President's Proclamation].
75. Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44.
76. President's Proclamation, sipra note 74.
77. Foreign Assets Control Regs., 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-901 (2008); Transaction Control Regs., 31 C.F.R.
§§ 505.01-60 (2008).
78. Exec. Order No. 13466, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,787 (June 26, 2008) (declaring a new national emergency,
under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, "to deal
with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States"
posed by "the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean
Peninsula").
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strictions with respect to North Korea that otherwise would have been lifted pursuant to
the proclamation.79 These restrictions included the continued blocking of "property and
interests ... that... were blocked as of June 16, 2000," as well as the prohibition against
U.S. persons registering "vessel[s] in North Korea, obtain[ing] authorization for a vessel
to fly the North Korean flag, or own[ing], leas[ing], operat[ing], or insur[ing] any vessel
flagged by North Korea." s0
F. SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS
In addition to actions discussed elsewhere, OFAC frequently updated the Specially Des-
ignated National List under a variety of programs. Of note, designations in 2008 were
particularly directed toward designating global terrorists.8 1
G. ROUGH DIAMONDS
On May 21, 2008, OFAC issued a notice amending the Rough Diamonds Control Reg-
ulations82 to enhance the collection of statistical data on importations and exportations of
rough diamonds. 83 Specifically, these amendments (i) add a new note to section 592.301
of the regulations explaining that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will not
release shipments of rough diamonds unless the import paperwork conforms with CBP's
formal entry for consumption requirements set forth in CBP's regulations8 4 and (ii) add a
new section to these regulations, which requires rough diamond importers and exporters
to file an annual report with the Department of State detailing their import, export and
stockpiling information.
H. TERRORISM
Under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations,85 OFAC may designate additional
persons "otherwise associated with" already designated persons and subject the assets of
these associated persons to blocking requirements. OFAC added forty-one parties to, and
removed nine parties from, its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists over the past
year86 and released a report in October 2008 on the effectiveness of its asset blocking
programs in combating international terrorism.8 7
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally Global Terrorism Sanctions Regs., 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.101-901 (2008); Terrorism Sanctions
Regs., 31 C.F.R. §§ 595.101-901 (2008); Terrorism List Gov'ts Sanctions Regs., 31 C.F.R. §§ 596.101-901
(2008); Foreign Terrorist Orgs. Sanctions Regs., 31 C.F.R.§§ 597.101-901 (2008).
82. Rough Diamonds Control Regs., 31 C.F.R. §§ 592.101-801 (2008).
83. Rough Diamonds Control Regs., 73 Fed. Reg. 29,433 (May 21, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts.
592.301 and 592.502).
84. See Entered for Consumption, 19 C.F.R. § 141.0a(f) (2008).
85. Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ pt. 594.101-201 (2008).
86. See 2008 OFAC, supra note 63.
87. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TERRORIST ASSETS RE-
PORT: SIXTEENTH ANNIuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNTrED STATES OF TERRORIST
COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES (2008), available at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2007.pdf. The report noted that "programs targeting in-
ternational terrorist organizations [have] resulted in the blocking" of $20 million of U.S. assets and that more
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I. TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT
On November 7, 2008, OFAC updated its guidelines for submitting applications under
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 for licenses to export
agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran and Sudan. 88
J. OTHER OFAC REGULATORY PRONOUNCEMENTS
In addition to the other OFAC regulatory pronouncements described herein, OFAC
issued guidance regarding the release of blocked funds as well as new guidance directed
toward the securities industry.
1. Release of Blocked Funds
OFAC issued Guidance on the Release of Limited Amounts of Blocked Funds for Payment of
Legal Fees and Costs Incurred in Challenging the Blocking of U.S. Persons in Administrative or
Civil Proceedings (July 21, 2008)89 and Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property
and Interests in Property are Blocked (Feb. 14, 2008).90 The July guidance
provides for the issuance of specific licenses [by OFAC], on a case-by-case basis, to
authorize the release of a limited amount of blocked funds [(not full compensation)]
for the payment of legal fees and costs incurred in seeking administrative reconsidera-
tion or judicial review of the designation of U.S. persons or the blocking of [their]
property and interests
pursuant to Executive Orders and OFAC regulations where such persons do not have
access to alternative funding sources. 91 It also sets forth several licensing requirements
that designated or blocked parties must satisfy (e.g., evidence of U.S. person status and
itemization of legal fees) and describes the monetary limitations regarding caps on legal
fees and hourly rates consistent with federal legislation.92
OFAC issued the February guidance in response to multiple inquiries received by the
agency. OFAC broadly defined "blocked property" to include any property or interest in
property, whether tangible or intangible, future or contingent, or direct or indirect. 93 Ac-
than "$315 million in assets are blocked [under] sanctions imposed" against the "five designated state spon-
sors of terrorism." Id. at 2.
88. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, LICENSE APPLICATION
GUIDELINES FOR EXPORTS TO IRAN AND SUDAN OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, MEDICINE, AND MED-
ICAL DEVICES, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/common/tsraapp.pdf.
89. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE ON THE RE-
LEASE OF LIMITED AMOUNTS OF BLOCKED FUNDS FOR PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES AND COSTS INCURRED
IN CHALLENGING THE BLOCKING OF U.S. PERSONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE OR CIML PROCEEDINGS, available
at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/icensing/guidance/lega-fee-guide.pdf [hereinafter July
Guidance].
90. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE ON ENTITIES
OWNED BY PERSONS WHOSE PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY ARE BLOCKED, available at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/common/licensing-guidance.pdf [hereinafter February
Guidance].
91. July Guidance, supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. February Guidance, supra note 90.
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cording to the Guidance, regardless of whether the entity itself is listed, U.S. persons
generally may not engage in any transactions with an entity in which a blocked person
"owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 [percent] or greater interest."94 OFAC also cautions
U.S. persons to be careful in transacting business with non-blocked entities that are con-
trolled by or have a significant ownership amount of less than fifty percent by a blocked
person 95 as they may in the future be designated by OFAC as blocked persons. 96
2. OFAC Compliance for the Securities Industry
On November 6, 2008, OFAC issued guidance relating to OFAC-related due diligence
procedures in the securities industry, particularly in connection with the client acceptance
process, and the selection of new investments or transactions. 97 Of note, the guidance
emphasized that securities firms should document the results of their transaction screen-
ing processes as well as conduct adequate due diligence regarding the beneficial ownership
of certain types of accounts, including, particularly, omnibus accounts. 98 In addition, this
guidance included a list of risk factors, which may warrant a heightened level of scrutiny,
associated with (a) international transactions, including wire transfers, (b) foreign custom-
ers/accounts, (c) foreign broker-dealers who are not subject to OFAC regulations, (d) in-
vestments in foreign securities, (e) certain forms of investment funds and accounts
creating an intermediary relationship, (0 third-party introduced business and (g) confiden-
tial accounts.99
K. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, SETTLEMENTS, AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2008, OFAC continued its practice of periodically posting important informational
documents and final agency Penalty Notices and relevant case reports0° on its website,




97. OFFICE .O FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OPENING SECURITIES AND
FirnURES ACCOU'rS I ROM AN OFAC PERSPECTivE, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/articles/securitiesfuture accounts_1 1052008.pdf [hereinafter Opening Securities); OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTrROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, RISK FACTORS FOR OFAC COMPLIANCE IN THE SECUR-
ITIES INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/policy/securities-risk-
l1052008.pdf [hereinafter Risk Factors].
98. Opening Securities, supra note 97.
99. Risk Factors, supra note 97.
100. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Civil Penalties Enforcement Informa-
tion, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/2008.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Penalties]. Notable actions involved York International Corporation (May 2, 2008), which was fined
"$669,507 to settle allegations" that it sold "equipment to Iran and Sudan by foreign nationals employed at a
foreign branch of York, and improper payments made to the Government of Iraq in connection with licensed
sales of refrigeration equipment to Iraq under the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program;" Engineering Dy-
namics Inc. (May 2, 2008), which was fined $132,791.39 "as part of a multi-agency settlement" related to
allegations that it "acted in a knowing and willful manner by importing and exporting unauthorized goods
and services to and from Iran ... to assist in the design of offshore oil and gas structures;" and Minxia Non-
Ferrous Metals, Inc. (July 11, 2008), which paid the largest penalty of the period, "$1,198,000 to settle allega-
tions" that it acted without an OFAC license or outside the scope of its license by purchasing or otherwise
dealing in Cuban metals." OFAC Enforcement Information for May 2, 2008, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
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ment Act and new economic sanctions enforcement guidelines. According to OFAC's
website, fifty-four companies agreed to or received penalties for violations of the Burmese,
Cuban, Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor, Iranian, Iraqi, Libyan, Sudanese, ter-
rorism and narcotics trafficking sanctions programs between January 4, 2008, and Septem-
ber 5, 2008.101 During the same period, seven companies were penalized $100,000 or
more, and thirty-seven individuals were penalized, primarily for dealing in property in
which Cuba or a Cuban national had an interest. 0 2
In addition, on June 10, 2008, OFAC published its final rule amending the civil penalty
provisions affecting seventeen parts of the OFAC regulations for which IEEPA provides
civil penalty authority.103 The amendments are technical updates to reflect the substantial
increase in civil penalty authority resulting from the enactment in October 2007 of the
IEEPA Enhancement Act; i.e. they modify the relevant civil penalty provisions to reflect
that the current maximum civil penalty is the greater of $250,000 or twice the amount of
the transactions that is the basis of the violation.
Furthermore, on September 8, 2008, OFAC issued its Economic Sanctions Enforce-
ment Guidelines' 0 4 following the enactment of the IEEPA Enhancement Act. These
guidelines establish the new framework by which OFAC will determine the appropriate
response to any apparent violations and, if a civil penalty is warranted, assess the amount
of the penalty. 105
According to the guidelines, the two most important factors affecting OFAC's penalty
assessment are whether the case is "egregious" or "non-egregious" and whether a volun-
tary self-disclosure was made.106 OFAC will utilize a two-pronged approach to penalty
assessment: one for "egregious" cases and another for "non-egregious" cases. The guide-
lines also indicate that OFAC generally intends to limit the use of the $250,000 statutory
maximum as a penalty basis for what it determines to be "egregious" cases. 107 Whether a
case will be deemed "egregious" will be based on a case-by-case evaluation of what OFAC
calls "General Factors", 10 8 four of which will be given substantial weight in any such de-
termination: willful or reckless violation, "awareness of the conduct..., harm to sanctions
program objectives, and individual characteristics of the" parties involved, such as com-
mercial sophistication, size of business operations and volume of transactions. 10 9 OFAC
will place particular emphasis on the first two factors.
The second major element to be considered by OFAC is the submission of a voluntary
self-disclosure. In egregious cases, submitting a voluntary self-disclosure will reduce the
penalty to one-half of the $250,000 statutory maximum, while submitting a voluntary self-
enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/05292008.pdf; OFAC Enforcement Information for July 11, 2008, http:/
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/07312008.pdf.
101. Civil Penalties, upra note 100.
102. Id.
103. Int'l Emergency Econ. Powers Act Civ. & Crim. Penalties, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,650 Gune 10, 2008) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 535-42, 545, 560, 585-88, and 593-95).





108. The term "General Factors" replaces the use of "mitigating" and "aggravating" factors.
109. 73 Fed. Reg. 51,933.
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disclosure in a non-egregious case will reduce the penalty to one-half of the actual transac-
tion value capped at $125,000 per violation. 110 The guidelines also provide for a variety of
enforcement measures short of issuing monetary penalties, including the issuance of
"Findings of Violation" where a violation has occurred but a monetary penalty is not war-
ranted, and a Cautionary Letter where OFAC has been unable to determine, based on the
evidence, that a violation has occurred, but OFAC is concerned that the underlying con-
duct is problematic for sanctions compliance."i
L. COURT CASES INVOLVING OFAC PROGRAMS
In addition to significant activity at the agency, the past year also saw significant court
activity. These rulings reinforced the U.S. federal government's ability to apply its eco-
nomic sanctions across international boundaries but limited the ability of individual states
to apply their own, even more stringent, economic sanctions upon foreign activities.
In Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Roberts,112 the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held that provisions of the 2006 Florida Travel Act are
unconstitutional because they constitute an impermissible sanction on designated state
sponsors of terrorism and "serve[ ] as an obstacle to the objectives of the federal govern-
ment." 113 The court held that the Travel Act's restrictions on the use of non-state funds
constitute more than an "incidental or indirect" effect on foreign affairs and therefore
infringe upon foreign affairs power of the federal government. 114 In addition, the Court
held that the "Act's restriction[s] on [non-state] funds, [as well as] nominal state funds
necessary to administer [such non-state] funds," are unconstitutional because they "im-
pede[ ] the President's authority to speak with one voice for the Nation in dealing with
state sponsors of terrorism." 115
The District Court for the Northern District of California in Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights of San Francisco Bay Area v. U.S. Department of the Treasury ordered the Trea-
sury Department to disclose, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), certain
OFAC records regarding its Specially Designated Nationals List. 116 In particular, the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int'l University v. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
113. Id. Florida Travel Act, 2006 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2006-54 (S.B. 2434) (West), an Act relating to
travel to terrorist states, restricted state universities from spending state and "non-state" funds on activities
related to travel to a "terrorist state," meaning any state designated by the U.S. State Department as a state
sponsor of terrorism. According to the Act, "In]one of the state or nonstate funds made available to state
universities may be used to implement, organize, direct, coordinate, or administer, or to support the imple-
mentation, organization, direction, coordination, or administration of, activities related to or involving travel
to a terrorist state." Roberts, 574 F. Supp. at 1336. In addition, "[t]ravel expenses of public officers of employ-
ees for the purpose of implementing, organizing, directing, coordinating, or administering, or supporting the
implementation, organization, direction, coordination, or administration of, activities related to or involving
travel to a terrorist state shall not be allowed under any circumstances." Id.
114. Roberts, 574 F. Supp. at 1335. The Court found that these provisions of the Travel Act are preempted
by federal law regarding state sponsors of terrorism, including TTA, CACR, IEEPA, the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act, as well as several regulations relating to travel to Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
115. Id. at 1354.
116. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights of San Francisco Bay Area v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 534 F. Supp.
2d 1126, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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Court required the Treasury Department to disclose delisting petitions after determining
that the documents did not fall under any of the relevant FOIA exemptions to
disclosure. 17
117. The Court held that the Treasury Department was not entitled to withhold the delisting petitions
because it had not shown that the disclosure of the petitions "could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings," or "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any
individual," as required under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(A) and (F), respectively. In addition, the Court held that
the Treasury Department was not entitled to relief under six other exemptions (under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6),
(7)(C), (7)(D), (3), and (4)) because the Treasury Department did not meet its burden of demonstrating the
portions of the petitions to which the exemptions should be applied. Furthermore, the Court was unable to
determine the portions of the petitions to which the exemptions should apply because the Treasury Depart-
ment did not submit a Vaughn index, which would have identified each document withheld and the statutory
exemption claimed and would have explained how the disclosure of the particular portion of the document
would damage the interest protected by the claimed exemption.
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